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CRIMINOLOGY
THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A META-ANALYSIS
JOEL H. GARNER, CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL & JINA
LEE*
A dozen systematic reviews published since 1978 have sought to clarify
the complexities of deterrence theory. These reviews emphasize the general
deterrent effects of police presence, arrest, and incarceration on rates of
homicide and other serious crimes, such as assault, rape, and burglary.
These reviews provide less attention to specific deterrence processes and to
the deterrent impacts of intermediate sanctions, such as prosecution or
conviction; none of these reviews incorporate any of the research on criminal
sanctions for intimate partner violence. To address these limitations, this
research uses meta-analytic methods to assess the specific deterrent effects
of three post-arrest criminal sanctions—prosecution, conviction, and
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incarceration—for one offense type—intimate partner violence. Based upon
57 studies that reported 237 tests of specific deterrence theory, the effects of
sanctions varied: there is a marginal deterrent effect for prosecution, no
effect for conviction, and a large escalation effect among incarcerated
offenders. In addition, deterrent effects in the available research are stronger
in tests that use more rigorous research designs, that measure repeat
offending using victim interviews instead of official records, and that use new
offenses against the same victim—not new arrests or new convictions against
any victim—as the criteria for repeat offending.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between criminal sanctions and criminal behavior is an
enduring theme throughout classical and contemporary criminological
thought. 1 Lawrence Sherman goes so far as to assert that the “conceptual core
1
See, e.g., Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949 (1966); CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT
(Albany, NY, W.C. Little & Co. 1872); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (New Ed., Clarendon Press 1907) (1780); NAT’L
RSCH. COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
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of criminology is the science of sanction effects . . . .” 2 Scholars have
interpreted the relationship between the application of criminal sanctions and
subsequent criminal offending in terms of labeling theory, 3 re-integrative
shaming, 4 victim empowerment, 5 and defiance. 6 Much of the contemporary
scholarly literature on criminal sanctions, like much of the current policy
attention, focuses on deterrence theory—the argument that potential
offenders are dissuaded from future criminality by the threat of future
penalties that are appropriately swift, certain, and severe. 7
The deterrence framework, articulated by Cesare Beccaria as part of an
effort to reduce the severity of the then-common penalties of execution,
torture, and lengthy incarceration, 8 is employed in the contemporary
American context to support the use of capital punishment; 9 longer prison
sentences; 10 mandatory prison terms for using a firearm in the commission
of a felony; 11 the threat of more severe sanctions for youth violence and drug
sales; 12 prosecution for tax evasion; 13 increases in the number of sworn police
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin, eds.,
1978); GERHARD O. W. MUELLER, SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PURPOSE § 12 (1977); Jack P.
Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 515 (1968); Daniel S. Nagin,
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199 (2013).
2
Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the
Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 446 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
3
See David P. Farrington & Joseph Murray, Empirical Tests of Labeling Theory in
Criminology, in 18 LABELING THEORY: EMPIRICAL TESTS 1, 1–9 (David P. Farrington & Joseph
Murray eds., 2014) (describing the history of testing labeling theory).
4
See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989)
(presenting the seminal articulation of the logic and effects of reintegrative shaming).
5
See generally Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, What is Empowerment
Anyway? A Model for Domestic Violence Practice, Research, and Evaluation, 5 PSYCH.
VIOLENCE 84 (2015) (identifying a common empowerment framework for researchers and
practitioners).
6
See Sherman, supra note 2, at 459–66.
7
E.g., JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973)
(explicating the elements of deterrence theory).
8
See BECCARIA, supra note 1, at 93–111.
9
See Issac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (providing an early economic analysis of the benefits
of capital punishment).
10
Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish
Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 346–50 (1999).
11
ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT, 30–32 (1981).
12
See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE
PROSPECT OF SANCTION 142–65 (Peter Reuter & Ernesto U. Savona eds., 2009).
13
Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of
Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 209, 238–39 (1989).
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officers; 14 police foot patrols; 15 hot-spots policing; 16 stop-and-frisk police
tactics; 17 arrest for juvenile offenders; 18 arrest of prostitution clients; 19 and
arrest, 20 prosecution, 21 conviction, 22 and incarceration23 for intimate partner
violence.
Amidst the violent upheavals of the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes
asserted that the state’s use of criminal sanctions was necessary to preserve
the commonwealth, without which life would be “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.” 24 A century later in Italy, Cesare Beccaria argued that,
while criminal sanctions are necessary, authorities should constrain their use
because “[t]he end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the
criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from
committing the like offence.” 25 Beccaria’s twin goals for punishment provide
the groundwork for modern distinctions between specific deterrence—to
influence the sanctioned offender—and general deterrence—to influence the
behavior of others. General deterrent effects of sanctions are seen as having
an indirect impact on the behavior of individuals whether or not they have
14

Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of
Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 286 (1997).
15
Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Travis Taniguchi, Elizabeth R. Groff & Jennifer D. Wood, The
Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol
Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 795, 818 (2011).
16
Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M. Hureau, The Effects of Hot
Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633,
655–56 (2014).
17
See David Weisburd, Alese Wooditch, Sarit Weisburd & Sue-Ming Yang, Do Stop,
Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 46–47
(2016).
18
See Douglas A. Smith & Patrick R. Gartin, Specifying Specific Deterrence: The
Influence of Arrest on Future Criminal Activity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 94, 102–03 (1989).
19
See Devon. D. Brewer, John J. Potterat, Stephen Q. Muth & John M. Roberts, Jr., A
Large Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrest for Patronizing a Prostitute, 1 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2
(2006).
20
See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 268–70 (1984).
21
BARBARA J. HART & ANDREW R. KLINE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RESEARCH FOR VICTIM ADVOCATES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
156–59 (2013).
22
Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7 ONLINE
J. ISSUES NURSING 4, 7–8 (2002), http://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANA
Marketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume72002/No1Jan2002/Domestic
ViolenceandCriminalJustice.html [https://perma.cc/633P-KKL5].
23
Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1542–44 (1997).
24
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 78 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster Univ. 1999) (1651).
25
BECCARIA, supra note 1, at 47.
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previously committed an offense or whether they have been sanctioned or
not. Specific deterrent effects of sanctions have traditionally been seen as
more direct and as only affecting offenders who have been sanctioned. 26
However, our understanding of specific deterrence has been broadened to
consider the extent to which avoiding sanctions increases future offending as
well as whether being sanctioned reduces future offending. 27
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. REVIEWS OF DETERRENCE RESEARCH

The extensive body of research that invokes deterrence theory to
interpret the empirical relationships between criminal sanctions and
offending has generated a dozen detailed reviews since 1978. 28 These
reviews assess a large and diverse body of research that includes a variety of
empirically tested hypotheses about whether, to what extent, and in what
direction various aspects of contemporary criminal sanctions affect any or all
aspects of subsequent criminal behavior. 29 While none of these reviews
capture all the composite parts of deterrence theory, they are part of a vibrant,
contemporary enthusiasm to clarify the complexities of deterrence theory and
26

Johannes Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 78–79 (1968).
Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific
Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 123, 127–29 (1993).
28
See Robert Apel, Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal
Deterrence, 29 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 67, 93 (2013); Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin,
General Deterrence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179, 179–
206 (Michael Tonry, ed., 2011); Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 5–6 (2017); Philip J. Cook, Research in
Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 CRIME & JUST.
211, 211–268 (1980); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can
Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 13–54 (2011); Daniel S. Nagin,
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST.
1, 1–42 (1998) [hereinafter Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research]; Daniel S. Nagin, General
Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION:
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, supra note 1, at 95–139
[hereinafter Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence]; Daniel S.
Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and Police, 53
CRIMINOLOGY 74, 74–100 (2015); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived
Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173
(1987); Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, (2010) [hereinafter Paternoster, How Much Do We
Really Know]; Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and
Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 415–17, 427–28 (2005); Kirk. R.
Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical
Review, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545, 545–572 (1986).
29
See supra note 28.
27
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to determine the conditions under which deterrent effects can and cannot be
found. One consistent theme in these reviews is that detecting the existence
and estimating the size of deterrent effects is difficult and that every approach
to studying deterrence effects has inconsistent findings, and methodological
and measurement limitations. 30
Research on general deterrence has long relied on research designs that
use official records of actual sanctions to compare the annual number of
arrests, police officers, prison populations, or executions with data on offense
types, such as homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and burglary, captured in the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. 31 In this macro-level research
approach, the number of individual-level sanctions and offenses are
aggregated to the level of cities, counties, standard metropolitan statistical
areas, or states, and compared between jurisdictions and over time. The
recognition of measurement errors in the available data and the inability to
resolve disputes over the appropriate identification criteria in macro-level
statistical models encouraged evaluators of deterrence theory to study the
effects of variation in official sanctions in single locations over time, 32
between treatment and control locations in a particular jurisdiction,33 among
different individuals in a particular jurisdiction, 34 or for the same individuals
over time. 35 In the 1970s, Franklin Zimring recommended the use of targeted
policy interventions such as clinical trials, longitudinal surveys, matching,
propensity scoring, quasi-experiments, bivariate and multivariate analyses,
comparisons of nonequivalent treatment and control groups, and even
qualitative studies as valuable approaches for testing deterrence theory. 36
Subsequently, evaluations of policy interventions became a major

30
31

111.

See id.
Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, supra note 28, at 99–

32
See, e.g., Lan Shi, The Limit of Oversight in Policing: Evidence from the 2001
Cincinnati Riot, 93 J . PUB. ECON. 99 (2009).
33
See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of
Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995).
34
See, e.g., John D. Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Reconsidering Domestic
Violence Recidivism: Conditioned Effects of Legal Controls by Individual and Aggregate
Levels of Stake in Conformity, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 45 (2002).
35
See, e.g., Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Wife Assault, Costs of Arrest, and the
Deterrence Process, 29 J. RSCH. & CRIME DELINQ. 292 (1992).
36
Franklin E. Zimring, Policy Experiments in General Deterrence: 1970–75, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES supra note 1, at 140, 140–86.
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component of the contemporary literature on deterrence theory. 37 While
macro-level analyses comparing crime rates between jurisdictions are limited
to the study of general deterrence, focused policy interventions can test either
general deterrence or specific deterrence, depending primarily on whether
the link between sanctions and subsequent offending is analyzed at the
individual level or at one or more aggregate levels. Focused policy
interventions typically are limited to one or two jurisdictions and this
weakens their ability to generalize study findings to other jurisdictions
without independent replications in numerous and diverse locations.38
Although there are additional methodological considerations in the study of
focused policy interventions, Daniel Nagin’s assessment is that “wellconducted experimental and quasi-experimental studies of deterrence
provide the most convincing evidence of the circumstances under which
deterrence is and is not effective.” 39
In addition to macro-level studies and evaluations of focused policy
interventions, existing reviews of deterrence research include a substantial
body of research that does not rely on the objective properties of punishment
(measured by official records) but more directly assesses the role that
perceptions of criminal sanctions play in potential offenders’ decisionmaking process (measured primarily through in-depth interviews with
potential offenders). 40 Just as the macro-level comparisons of sanction
policies cannot assess the specific deterrent impact of official sanctions on
individuals, evaluations of focused policy interventions based only on
official records of sanctions cannot determine how potential offenders make
decisions. They can, however, determine whether the association between
sanctions and subsequent behavior is or is not in the direction predicted by
deterrence theory. While there is general agreement on the importance of
understanding the link between official sanctioning behavior and the
perceptions of potential offenders about those sanctions, researchers disagree
sharply 41 about the extent to which changes in the likelihood or severity of
37
Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, The Deterrent Effects of Imprisonment, 43, 48 in
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS (Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Justin
McCrary eds., 2011); Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research, supra note 28, at 4.
38
William Alex Pridemore, Matthew C. Makel & Jonathan A. Plucker, Replication in
Criminology and the Social Sciences, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 19, 21–24 (2018).
39
Nagin, supra note 1, at 215–16.
40
Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know, supra note 28, at 780–86.
41
Compare Nagin, Solow & Lum, supra note 28, at 95 (“We are optimistic that creative
interviewing techniques can be devised to identify how police tactics influence offender
perceptions of apprehension risk.”), with Justin T. Pickett & Sean Patrick Roche, Arrested
Development: Misguided Directions in Deterrence Theory and Policy, 15 CRIMINOLOGY &
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official sanctions are accurately perceived by potential offenders as well as
the importance of these perceptions, accurate or not, in offender decisionmaking. Research on offender decision-making, embedded within rational
choice theory, includes factors other than criminal sanctions that might better
explain the circumstances under which individuals will and will not get
involved in one or more types of criminal behavior. 42 Those factors may vary
by an individual’s personality traits and do not need to be rational
assessments of the potential gain or loss involved in offending.43 Moreover,
these factors could include emotions and other irrational considerations that
might be especially relevant to understanding violence between intimate
partners. 44 Research from the rational choice perspective can also incorporate
recent advances in behavioral economics that emphasize the use of heuristics
and other mental shortcuts in a wide range of human decision-making. 45 The
broader scope of explanatory factors considered within the rational choice
perspective will likely enhance our understanding of the relative impact of
sanctions in offender decision-making. However, none of the existing studies
assessing the impact of prosecution, conviction, or imprisonment on intimate
partner violence have collected this type of information from potential
offenders. For this reason, our current understanding of the impact of postarrest sanctions on intimate partner violence is derived from analyses on
focused policy interventions.
B. LIMITATIONS IN DETERRENCE REVIEWS

The existing reviews of deterrence research have two substantial
limitations. First, they focus almost exclusively on the use of arrest or
imprisonment and ignore the possible impact of intermediate level sanctions.
Steven Durlauf and Daniel Nagin’s review of deterrence research argues that
in future tests of deterrence theory, the magnitude of deterrent effects will
depend critically on the specific form of the sanction policy being studied.
PUB. POL’Y 727, 729 (2016) (“All prior studies examining the correlation between objective
and perceived arrest risk have yielded null results.”).
42
See Thomas A Loughran, Raymond Paternoster & Alex R. Piquero, Individual
Difference and Deterrence, in DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME 211, 215–19 (Daniel S.
Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson eds., 2018).
43
Justin T. Pickett & Shawn D. Bushway, Dispositional Sources of Sanction Perceptions:
Emotionality, Cognitive Style, Intolerance of Ambiguity, and Self-Efficacy, 39 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 624, 624 (2015).
44
Jean-Louis van Gelder & Reinout E. de Vries, Rational Misbehavior? Evaluating an
Integrated Dual-Process Model of Criminal Decision Making, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2014).
45
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (demonstrating
dual-track decisionmaking processes in a wide range of circumstances).
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Using an analogy from medicine, they argue that just as specific drugs are
evaluated based on their effectiveness at treating particular ailments, it would
be of great value if future research paid more attention to evaluations of the
effects of distinct types of sanctions on specific types of crimes.46 The second
limitation in the existing reviews of deterrence research is that none of them
consider the use of criminal sanctions for violent offenses against an intimate
partner, nor do they provide a rationale for excluding this substantial body of
research.
The purpose of this article is to address both of these limitations. First,
it provides a concise, qualitative review of the large number of existing
studies on the specific deterrent effects of arrest for intimate partner violence.
Second, it provides three systematic, quantitative meta-analyses of the
existing research on the specific deterrent effects of prosecuting, convicting,
and incarcerating intimate partner violence offenders.
C. DETERRENT EFFECTS OF ARREST

There is a large body of research that has addressed the specific
deterrent effects of arrest for intimate partner violence. The seminal study in
this area is a field experiment conducted in Minneapolis which randomly
assigned intimate partner violence offenders to one of three treatment groups:
an arrest, on-scene counseling, or physical separation. In the Minneapolis
experiment, the prevalence of re-offending by arrested offenders was about
half the rate of re-offending for offenders not arrested. 47 The results of the
Minneapolis experiment received extensive media attention and contributed
to the widespread adoption of policies that encouraged the use of arrest for
intimate partner violence. 48 The visibility and impact of the Minneapolis
experiment led to a coordinated program of five new experiments designed
as close but not exact replications of the Minneapolis experiment. The results
of these five experiments were published independently and the extent of
their support for specific deterrent effects of arrest varied by the source of
data on re-offending, by measures of re-offending, and by jurisdiction. 49
46

Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 37, at 85–86.
Sherman & Berk, supra note 20, at 267–68.
48
EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 94–99 (2003).
49
ANTHONY PATE, EDWIN E. HAMILTON & SAMPSON ANNAN, METRO-DADE SPOUSE
ABUSE REPLICATION PROJECT: DRAFT FINAL REPORT 621–66 (1991) (showing deterrent effects
from both official records and victim interviews but only the effects from victim interviews
were statistically significant); Richard A. Berk, Alec Campbell, Ruth Klap & Bruce Western,
A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
47
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None of the reported findings from these five studies found deterrent
effects as strong as those reported for the Minneapolis study; however,
several efforts to systematically assess the evidence from these experiments
tend to support the existence of some deterrent effects for arrest. First, a
qualitative assessment summarized the findings from the original
Minneapolis study and the five replication studies by arguing that the general
direction of the findings from three studies favored deterrent effects and that
the general direction of the other three studies favored escalation effects. This
review also argued that arrest had different effects on different types of
offenders. 50 A detailed summary of the published findings from the
Minneapolis experiment, the five replication experiments, and from a
companion experiment on arrest warrants 51 identified a total of thirty-five
common tests of specific deterrence; twenty-five (71%) of those tests were
in the direction of a deterrent effect and ten (29%) were in the direction of an
escalation effect. Eight of the twenty-five deterrent effects and none of the
escalation effects were statistically significant. 52
A meta-analysis of the findings from the six arrest experiments limited
only to data derived from victim interviews found an overall deterrent effect
for arrest. 53 An analysis of individual-level archived data for all five
replications involving 4,032 incidents with adult male suspects reported that,
CRIMINOLOGY 170, 184–98 (1992) (reporting deterrent effect from both official records and
from victim interviews, neither of which were statistically significant); Franklyn W. Dunford,
David Huizinga & Delbert S. Elliot, The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha
Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 195–202 (1990) (showing deterrent effects from
victim interview and escalation effects from official records, neither of which were statistically
significant); J. David Hirschel, Ira W. Hutchinson, III & Charles W. Dean, The Failure of
Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 19–28 (1992) (also showing
deterrent effects from victim interview and escalation effects from official records, neither of
which were statistically significant); Lawrence W. Sherman, Janelle D. Schmidt, Dennis P.
Rogan, Douglas A. Smith, Patrick R. Gartin, Ellen G. Cohn, J. Collins & Anthony R. Bacich,
The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence
Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 150–56 (1992) (showing escalation effects
for both official records and victim interviews, neither of which were statistically significant).
50
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, JANELLE D. SCHMDIT & DENNIS P. ROGAN, POLICING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 16–18 (1992).
51
Franklyn W. Dunford, System-Initiated Warrants for Suspects of Misdemeanor
Domestic Assault: A Pilot Study, 7 JUST. Q. 631, 641–50 (1990) (reporting consistent deterrent
effects for arrest warrants).
52
Joel Garner, Jeffrey Fagan & Christopher Maxwell, Published Findings from the
Spouse Assault Replication Program: A Critical Review, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
3, 11–20 (1995) .
53
David B. Sugarman & Sue Boney-McCoy, Research Synthesis in Family Violence: The
Art of Reviewing the Research, 4 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA, 55, 66–69
(2000).
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based on victim interviews, arrest was associated with statistically significant
reductions of 25% in the prevalence of new victimizations. The frequency of
new victimizations was reduced by 30%. Based on official records, arrest
was associated with an 8% reduction in the frequency of new victimizations,
but those effects were not statistically significant.54
Three teams of scholars have used non-experimental data extracted
from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to further examine
the specific deterrent effect of arrest. Based upon 2,565 incidents from 1992
to 2002, Richard Felson and his colleagues found that arrest was correlated,
but not significantly so, with a reduction in subsequent violence. 55 Hyunkag
Cho and Dina Wilke used a larger sample of 3,495 incidents the NCVS from
1987 to 2003 and found a statistically significant specific deterrent effect for
arresting intimate partner violence offenders. 56 Min Xie and James Lynch
reported a statistically significant deterrent effect for arrest among a sample
of 1,336 victims of intimate partner violence in the NCVS during the period
from 1996 through 2012; however, among a propensity score matched
subsample of 688 victims, they report a nonsignificant effect in the direction
of deterrence. 57
A recent non-experimental study based entirely on official police
reports concerning 5,466 couples in Seattle, Washington found that arrest
was associated with statistically significant reductions in both the prevalence
and frequency of future incidents of physical abuse. 58 Lastly, in the one study
of the effects of arrest on subsequent intimate partner violence that measured
individual perceptions of sanction costs, a national-level panel study found
statistically significant negative associations between individual perceptions
of the costs of arrest in 1986 with the prevalence of subsequent wife assault
in 1987. 59 While these nonexperimental studies generally rely on smaller
samples and use less rigorous methods than the SARP experiments, the
54

Christopher D. Maxwell, Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Preventive Effects of
Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: Research, Policy and Theory, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 51, 64–66 (2002).
55
Richard B. Felson, Jeffrey M. Ackerman & Catherine A. Gallagher, Police Intervention
and the Repeat of Domestic Assault, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 563, 576–78 (2005).
56
Hyunkag Cho & Dina J. Wilke, Does Police Intervention in Intimate Partner Violence
Work? Estimating the Impact of Batterer Arrest in Reducing Revictimization, 11 ADVANCES
SOC. WORK 283, 291–92 (2010).
57
Min Xie & James P. Lynch, The Effects of Arrest, Reporting to the Police, and Victim
Services on Intimate Partner Violence, 54 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 338, 353–55 (2017).
58
Vivian H. Lyons, Mary A. Kernic, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Victoria L. Holt & Marco
Carone, Use of Multiple Failure Models in Injury Epidemiology: A Case Study of Arrest and
Intimate Partner Violence Recidivism in Seattle, WA, 6 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2019).
59
Williams & Hawkins, supra note 35, at 301–05.
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reported effects consistently show at least small reductions in repeat
offending following arrest. However, none of the experimental and
nonexperimental studies about the deterrent effects of arrest were included
in prior reviews of deterrence research. 60
The existing research on the effects of arrest for intimate partner
violence is large, diverse, methodologically strong, and finds numerous but
not universal conditions under which some specific deterrent effects can be
identified. The mixed findings about the specific deterrent effects of arrest
suggest that it is plausible, but uncertain, that intimate partner violence
offenders may be responsive to specific deterrent effects produced by more
severe criminal sanctions, such as prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.
D

DETERRENT EFFECTS OF POST-ARREST SANCTIONS

The increased attention to and use of arrest as a preferred response to
intimate partner violence in the 1980s generated heightened attention about
whether those arrests were followed up with the filing of charges, convictions
or incarceration of offenders. 61 While some scholars have questioned
whether more severe post-arrest sanctions would, on their own, have any
deterrent effects on repeat intimate partner violence offending, 62 there is
widespread support for the use of these sanctions. 63 Further evidence of
support for the use of prosecution in domestic violence incidents is found in
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 64 under which the federal
government continues to provide financial support and training for the
development of intimate partner violence law enforcement, prosecution, and
victim services programs by state and local agencies. 65
60

See supra note 28.
See Joan Zorza, Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 71–72 (1992).
62
Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMEN BATTERING:
POLICY RESPONSES 95, 98–99 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Linda G. Mills, Mandatory
Arrest and Prosecution Policies for Domestic Violence: A Critical Literature Review and the
Case for More Research to Test Victim Empowerment Approaches, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
306, 311–13 (1998).
63
See, e.g., Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174–76 (1997); Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 881 (1994); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909 (1996).
64
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
65
See 34 U.S.C. §§ 12511, 10441–50 (2018); Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. on
Violence Against Women, Formula Grant Programs (on file with J. Crim. L. & Criminology)
(including funding requirements for law enforcement and prosecution programs).
61
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Some researchers and advocates for the use of more severe post-arrest
sanctions argued that prosecution and conviction in intimate partner violence
cases are so infrequent that they were incapable of having any overall effect
on offender behavior. Advocates for stronger sanctions have claimed that
prosecution “is rarely used.” 66 Leading researchers have asserted that there
was “widespread underprosecution of domestic violence cases,” 67 and that
there were “extremely infrequent prosecutions and adjudication” of intimate
partner violence. 68 A report from the National Research Council stated that
“prosecution rates of battering cases typically have been low.” 69 If these
assertions were accurate, it would be less important and more difficult to
study whether post-arrest sanctions reduced repeat offending; however, a
comprehensive review of 137 U.S. and Canadian studies reported that, while
rates varied greatly between jurisdictions, on average: (1) one-third of
reported offenses and three-fifths of recorded arrests for intimate partner
violence resulted in the filing of criminal charges; and (2) more than half of
all prosecutions for intimate partner violence resulted in a criminal
conviction. 70 While there are no comparable statistics on prosecution or
conviction rates for other offenses, the use of post-arrest sanctions is
sufficiently large and widespread to justify critical examination of the
potential effects of those sanctions.
Some scholars criticized the use of post-arrest criminal sanctions for
intimate partner violence for other reasons. Jeffrey Fagan objected to using
criminal sanctions as the primary mechanism to address intimate partner
violence, citing the complexity of domestic violence incidents, variety in
batterer types, and the vagaries of the criminal justice system. 71 Both Donald
Dutton and Linda Mills view mandated judicial and prosecutorial
interventions as unduly diminishing the victims’ role in determining their
own life course. 72 In addition, David Ford reported that some victims prefer
to separate themselves from the criminal justice system after the police have
66

LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 212 (1979).
SHERMAN, SCHMIDT & ROGAN, supra note 52, at 244.
68
Alissa P. Worden, The Changing Boundaries of the Criminal Justice System:
Redefining the Problem and the Response in Domestic Violence, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000,
at 215, 221 (2000).
69
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 118 (Nancy A.
Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996).
70
Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Prosecution and Conviction Rates for
Intimate Partner Violence, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV., 44, 53–54 (2009).
71
JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS
28–40 (1996).
72
DONALD G. DUTTON, RETHINKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 271 (2006); LINDA G. MILLS,
INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 11 (2003).
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240

GARNER, MAXWELL & LEE

[Vol. 111

helped them resolve a particular violent incident. 73 These criticisms
recognize possible impediments connected with mobilizing the criminal law,
but they do not directly question the existence of specific deterrent effects
when sanctions are applied.
The evidence supporting specific deterrent effects for arrest and the
widespread official support for post-arrest sanctions enhances the importance
of understanding the extent to which post-arrest criminal sanctions are
associated with changes in future incidents of intimate partner violence. The
only published review of the research on the deterrent effects of post-arrest
sanctions on intimate partner identified thirty-one reports published between
1984 and 2005 that reported 143 statistical comparisons of offending rates
following prosecution, conviction, or incarceration for intimate partner
violence. 74 Those statistical comparisons were analyzed by counting whether
the reported findings were in the direction predicted by deterrence theory and
whether those findings reached the commonly accepted level of statistical
significance. 75 Using this approach, this study found 24% of the reported
findings showed more severe sanctions associated with less repeat offending,
providing support for the deterrence hypothesis. Only 10% of the tests
showed that more severe sanctions were associated with more repeat
offending, supporting the escalation hypothesis. 66% of 143 statistical
comparisons of prosecution, conviction, and incarceration sanctions
generated no differences in repeat offending by the type of sanction received.
These proportions varied by sanction type. 39% of the prosecution tests were
associated with less repeat offending and only 6% were associated with more
repeat offending. About equal proportions of the statistical tests for
conviction and incarceration were and were not supportive of deterrent
effects. Thus, the one prior effort to assess the existing research found that
there appeared to be limited support for the existence of deterrence effects
associated with post-arrest sanctions and that the limited support for deterrent
effects varied by the type of post-arrest sanction.
The one existing review of the research on post-arrest sanctions has
several limitations. First, it was not based on a systematic search of the
existing literature and it did not explicitly define differences between the
three sanction types. Second, it treated all the studies the same regardless of
73

David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 315–17 (1991).
74
Christopher D. Maxwell & Joel H. Garner, Crime Control Effects of Criminal Sanctions
for Intimate Partner Violence, 3 PARTNER ABUSE 469, 484–85 (2012).
75
These tests compared re-offending rates between offenders who were prosecuted with
those who were not prosecuted; between those who were convicted with those who were not
convicted; and those who were incarcerated with those that were not incarcerated.

2021]

DETERRENT EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

241

their methodological rigor or the number of cases involved. Third, it did not
consider the lack of independence among the tests, since as many as fifteen
tests were generated from the same sample of cases. Lastly, the analysis of
these 143 statistical tests is a simple count of the direction and statistical
significance of reported findings without consideration of the relative size of
the effects reported; thus, a test producing just marginally statistically
significant results counts the same as a test whose effect is much larger. This
approach is considered methodologically weak and unlikely to produce a
reliable assessment of empirical research findings. 76
II. DESIGN OF THIS RESEARCH
This research applies more rigorous contemporary meta-analytic
methods to assess the existing body of research on the specific deterrent
effects of post-arrest criminal sanctions imposed on individuals accused of
intimate partner violence. Our substantive focus is on the conditions under
which specific deterrent effects do and do not exist. Our methodological
focus is on the appropriate quantitative methods to test for the direction, size
and statistical significance of these effects in the available research literature.
Our statistical analyses are designed to address two questions. First, to what
extent are post-arrest criminal sanctions—prosecution, conviction, or jail—
associated with lower rates of subsequent intimate partner violence? Second,
do characteristics of the study designs used in this body of research moderate
the association of sanctions with subsequent behavior? Our substantive
conclusions on deterrence effects stem primarily from the answers to the first
question; the answers to the second question are intended primarily to inform
the designs of future research on the use of sanctions for intimate partner
violence.
A. META-ANALYTIC METHODS

Since its development as an independent specialty in the statistical
sciences in the 1980s, meta-analysis has developed into a variety of formal
processes for explicitly incorporating multiple characteristics of individual
studies within a common research framework and is now used widely within
criminology to summarize existing research examining a public policy or a
scientific hypothesis; 77 meta-analytic methods produce standardized effect
sizes for reported results and summarize those results within and between the
76

FRANK L. SCHMIDT & JOHN E. HUNTER, METHODS OF META-ANALYSIS: CORRECTING
ERROR AND BIAS IN RESEARCH FINDINGS 453–57 (3d ed. 2015).
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See Edward Wells, Uses of Meta‐Analysis in Criminal Justice Research: A Quantitative
Review, 26 JUST. Q. 268, 275–87 (2009).
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available studies. In criminology (and other applied fields), meta-analyses
typically produce two types of findings: first, an assessment of the empirical
support for a particular theory, policy, or program; and second, an assessment
of the quality of the existing research literature. Meta-analytic methods
involve a number of explicit choices about how to define and identify the
relevant research literature, how to compute standardized effect sizes, how
to select among multiple analyses reported within individual studies, how to
weigh and combine the contribution of individual studies, and how to assess
the likelihood that unidentified studies may influence the findings of the
meta-analysis. These explicit methods are contrasted against the potential for
more subjective and implicit judgments about these same issues in qualitative
literature reviews and in quantitative reviews that do not clearly and formally
articulate how they identify and analyze the available research. Despite these
differences, both qualitative and quantitative methods of research synthesis
are constrained by the nature, quality, and size of the available research on a
particular topic.
B. SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH

To be considered for inclusion in this meta-analysis, a study needed to
report about individuals who were alleged to have committed an intimate
partner violence offense, or who were charged with or convicted of a violent
offense against an intimate partner. The second criterion for inclusion is that
the study reported a quantitative estimate at the individual level about the
relationship between actual post-arrest dispositions of criminal charges for
intimate partner violence and rates of subsequent offending by the suspects
in those cases. This meta-analysis excludes analyses that used summary rates
of case disposition and repeat offending aggregated at the court or
jurisdiction level.
These criteria are derived from our interest in testing hypotheses about
specific deterrence. Our search for prior research had no restriction based on
the sample size or the type of statistical analyses reported. This meta-analysis
includes studies regardless of when their data were collected, when their
results were published, or the format of the written report. The review
considered English-language refereed journal articles, book chapters, books,
working papers, case reports, dissertations, and government reports.
While the design of this research is structured to assess the specific
deterrent effects of prosecution, conviction and incarceration, most of the
studies in this body of research conceptualized and articulated their efforts
not as a test of deterrence theory, but as atheoretical comparisons of the
effectiveness of one or more disposition types versus other disposition types.
For instance, Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite reported comparisons between
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defendants whose charges were dismissed versus those who were acquitted
at trial; they also compared defendants who were convicted and fined to those
who were convicted and sentenced to probation. 78 While these differences
might be important for other criminological purposes, within our conceptual
approach comparisons between dismissals and acquittals and between fines
and probation do not produce a clear contrast between a less severe sanction
and a more severe sanction and, therefore, were not considered as tests of
specific deterrence theory. In addition to excluding aggregate-level analyses,
the review is limited to comparisons of sanctions actually imposed on an
individual and does not include tests that compared two or more sanction
policies unless the report also included details about the nature and severity
of the sanctions actually imposed in each case.
Because the primary objective of this research is to test deterrence
theory, the meta-analysis established some theory-specific rules to code the
nature of post-arrest criminal sanctions. The taken approach placed all
criminal dispositions reported in the research into one of four categories of
increasing severity: not prosecuted, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated.
This conceptualization distinguishes between changes in legal status based
on concrete actions by prosecutors, juries, or judges: filing of criminal
charges, conviction in court, and a sentence involving incarceration. In this
understanding of criminal sanctions, the more severe sanctions subsume the
less severe ones—imprisoned defendants had been convicted and convicted
defendants had been charged. Each reported comparison between a more
severe sanction and a less severe sanction is a test of deterrence theory.
Prosecuted cases compared to cases that were not prosecuted constitute a test
of the specific deterrent effects of prosecution. Convicted cases compared to
cases not convicted constitute a test of the specific deterrent effects of
conviction and incarcerated cases compared to cases not incarcerated
constitute a test of the specific deterrent effects of incarceration.
This theoretical approach generates three sanction-specific null
hypotheses:
1. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for prosecuted
and not prosecuted intimate partner violence offenders.
2. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for convicted
and not convicted intimate partner violence offenders.
3. There is no difference in the rate of repeat offending for incarcerated
and not incarcerated intimate partner violence offenders.

78
John Wooldredge & Amy Thistlethwaite, Court Dispositions and Rearrest for Intimate
Assault, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 75, 86 (2005).
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1. Studies Identified
Using the selection criteria stated above and following established
approaches for searching for prior research documents,79 this research
completed a multiple keyword search of numerous online science publication
indexes, reviewed the abstracts of the identified studies to identify potentially
eligible ones, and conducted detailed reviews of publications that might
include eligible studies. Our search strategy used the following indexes: the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service’s (NCJRS) abstracts database,
the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data’s (NACJD) Online
Bibliography of Data-related Literature, ProQuest, Academic OneFile,
Elsevier Scopus, PubMed.gov, and the Web of Science (SSCI). Our searches
relied on three sets of relevant terms that best represent our key, intertwined
topics of intimate partner violence (fifteen terms), criminal court disposition
(fifteen terms), and recidivism (eleven terms). 80 However, pilot searches
revealed that searching a term independently produced a large number of hits
that were irrelevant to our focus. For instance, searching the phrase “intimate
partner violence” on its own generated 24,791 hits, and the term “recidivism”
resulted in 42,459 hits, each in a single electronic resource. Thus, we used
composite search commands with terms such as “and,” “or,” and “not.”
Additionally, our searches were also filtered by the following disciplines:
criminology, criminal justice, victimology, corrections, law and society,
criminal rehabilitation, social problems, women’s studies, family welfare,
sociology, and social science.
In addition to using these search terms, this review manually examined
bibliographies of relevant articles, books, and reviews for additional studies.
Once potential studies were identified, citations to those studies were
searched for additional studies using Google scholar.81

79

See generally David Moher, Alessandro Liberati, Jennifer Tetzlaff, Douglas G. Altman
& The PRISMA Group, Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and MetaAnalyses: The PRISMA Statement, 6 PLOS MED. 1 (2009) (describing guidelines for
systematic reviews and meta-analyses).
80
See infra Appendix 1 for lists of the search terms used for the systematic literature
search.
81
See Jeffrey G. Reed & Pam M. Baxter, Using Reference Databases, in THE HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND META-ANALYSIS 73, 89–90 (Harris Cooper, Larry V. Hedges &
Jeffrey C. Valentine eds., 2d ed. 2009) (identifying alternative ways to conduct citation
searches and the assumptions underlying their use).
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Figure 1: Identification of Research on Repeat Offending
Following Post-Arrest Sanctions for Intimate Partner Violence

Publications identified through
keyword search of databases
N = 935
(See Appendix A)

Publications identified in
references of known publications
N = 45

Potentially relevant reports identified by
keywords searches and reference reviews
N = 980

Duplicate publications
removed
N = 263

Abstracts reviewed by
one or more author
N = 717

Publications with no
eligible studies
N = 538

Potentially eligible studies identified
for full-text review by each author
N = 179

Reviewed publications
with no eligible studies
N = 150

29 Publications Identified

33 Independent Samples

57 distinct analyses

237 tests of specific deterrence
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The results of searching the existing databases to identify reports about
repeat offending following any post-arrest sanction for intimate partner
violence are displayed in Figure 1. Our initial keyword search identified 935
indexed publications and an additional 45 publications through a review of
bibliographic references and citations. After removing 263 duplicate
publications, 717 publication abstracts were reviewed by one or more
authors. The review of abstracts resulted in rejecting an additional 538
documents that did not include the type of research that met our inclusion
criteria. The full-text review of the 179 potentially eligible studies required
multiple reviews by all three co-authors to determine the exact nature of the
reported findings, the sample sizes involved, and the direction of the reported
effects. Moreover, the full-text review identified ten instances where the
reported findings did not include all the information needed to produce a
standardized effect—mostly standard errors or sample sizes. While metaanalyses would traditionally exclude these tests from their review, this
approach was to contact the authors of those reports by email requesting the
missing information about standard errors and sample sizes. Seven of the ten
contacted authors provided the information needed to compute standardized
effect sizes and these additional tests were included in this meta-analysis.
The selection criteria in this meta-analysis identified 237 tests of the
specific deterrent effects of post-arrest sanctions for intimate partner violence
in 29 documents (See Table 1). Published between 1989 and 2013, these
documents used samples that ranged in size from seventy-four to 66,759 case
dispositions. This literature includes analyses of more than 127,000 criminal
incidents from thirty-three U.S. or Canadian jurisdictions. The full-text
review of these publications also revealed that some publications included
more than one independent sample of cases. For instance, in 2003, Peterson
reported findings from a large sample of cases from all of New York City
with three tests of conviction and three tests of incarceration. 82 In the same
publication, Peterson also reported findings limited to Bronx County with
two tests of prosecution, two tests of conviction and two tests of
incarceration. 83 In 2004, Peterson reported new findings from two samples—
one from the last three months of 1998 and another from the first three
months of 2001—in New York County (Manhattan). For each sample,

82

RICHARD R. PETERSON, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, THE IMPACT OF CASE PROCESSING
RE-ARRESTS AMONG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS IN NEW YORK CITY 43–49 (2003)
(displaying the results of three bivariate tests and three multivariate tests in the New York City
sample).
83
Id. at 26–28; 30–34 (also displaying the results of three bi-variate and three multivariate
tests for the Bronx sample but in a different configuration).
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Peterson reported one test of the conviction and one test of incarceration. 84
Thus, in this example, our search process identified two documents, with four
samples, five studies and twelve tests of specific deterrence. As displayed in
Table 1, the complete results of our search process generated ten studies of
the prosecution hypothesis, twenty-six studies of the conviction hypothesis,
and twenty-one studies of the incarceration hypothesis.

84

RICHARD R. PETERSON, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, THE IMPACT OF MANHATTAN’S
SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 57–61 (2004) (reporting one multivariate test of
conviction and one multivariate test of incarceration in each sample).
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2. Multiple Tests within Studies
The reporting of multiple tests within a single study is typically
encouraged within criminology and other scientific disciplines as a way for
an individual study to demonstrate either the strength or generalizability of
particular findings. However, multiple tests create problems for all
approaches to research synthesis because it is not clear which tests, or
combination of tests, to consider and how to weight the importance of one
test over another. The particular nature of that problem for this meta-analysis
is revealed in Table 1, which lists for each publication the number of
individual tests of specific deterrence with each of our three sanction types—
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. Twelve of the thirty-three studies
in Table 1 report tests for only one sanction type. However, fifteen report
tests for two sanction types and six report tests for all three sanction types.
Because some studies sometimes use some of the same incidents to test
multiple sanction types, our tests across these three sanction types are not
completely independent of each other. For this reason, we emphasize the
separate results from each sanction type.
There is a second, and more important, concern about the independence
of the 237 statistical tests reported in Table 1. Multiple tests of a particular
hypothesis can occur in a number of different ways, such as when authors
use data on repeat offending from victim interviews and official records, or
when they report repeat offending for both three months after the sanction
and separately for six months after the sanction. For instance, Peterson
reports three tests of the conviction hypothesis in his New York City sample.
One of those tests is produced by a bivariate analysis of any subsequent
offenses against anyone. The second test is a bivariate analysis of any
subsequent violent offense against any domestic partner and the third test is
a multivariate analysis of the same offense and victim type as the second test.
All three of these tests use the same set of individual case dispositions, and
using all three tests would violate traditional statistical assumptions that each
test is an independent estimate of the relationship under investigation. 85
When dependences exist between one or more tests, there is a greater
likelihood of producing biased and imprecise estimates or falsely rejecting a
true null hypothesis. 86 There are additional statistical concerns in this
85
See NOEL A. CARD, APPLIED META-ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 191–94
(2012).
86
See Mariola Moeyaert, Maaike Ugille, S. Natasha Beretvas, John Ferron, Rommel
Bunuan & Wim Van den Noortgate, Methods for Dealing with Multiple Outcomes in MetaAnalysis: A Comparison Between Averaging Effect Sizes, Robust Variance Estimation and
Multilevel Meta-Analysis, 20 INT’L J. SOC. RSCH. METHODOLOGY, 559, 567–69 (2017); Betsy
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research because some studies reported many tests and other studies reported
only a few tests, or just a single one.
C. USING THE “BEST” TEST METHOD

The design of this research addresses the lack of independence among
multiple tests of the same hypothesis within a single study by selecting the
one “best” test based on the methodological rigor of the available tests within
each study. 87 For instance, in Peterson’s test of the conviction hypothesis
referenced earlier, the methodologically strongest test is the multivariate
analysis using only violence offenses against an intimate partner. In addition
to the merits of estimating the size of the deterrent effect based on standards
of methodological rigor, this approach also benefits from directly estimating
standard errors based on a single test. In selecting the “best” test, we assume
that there are sufficiently clear methodological preferences for some types of
analyses over others, that these preferences can be applied objectively to the
existing research, and that these rules will result in the identification of the
single “best” test within each study.
Based on the nature of the research found and the hypotheses tested in
this research, the “best” test was identified using seven criteria for selecting
from among duplicate tests within each of the fifty-seven studies listed in
Table 1. These criteria are the type of analyses, the size of the treatment
group, the length of the follow-up period, the source of data, the offense type,
the victim type, and the criterion (e.g., re-offense, re-arrest, re-conviction)
used to denote recidivism.
For analysis type, we selected multivariate over bivariate results, and
then among multiple multivariate analyses, selected count regression models
over survival analyses and survival analyses over logistic regression. Among
bivariate models, counts and means were selected over correlations and
correlations over simple prevalence measures. If there were still multiple
tests after selecting from among these analysis types, we selected tests with
the largest treatment group or the longest follow-up period as the preferred
test. If these criteria were not sufficient to identify a “best” test, the use of
victim interviews were preferred over official records, outcome measures
based on new offenses were preferred over measures based on new arrests
and use of new arrests was preferred over new convictions. If these criteria
J. Becker, Multivariate Meta-Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS

AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING 499, 502–03 (Howard E. A. Tinsley & Steven D. Brown eds.,

2000); MICHAEL BORENSTEIN, LARRY V. HEDGES, JULIAN P. T. HIGGINS & HANNAH R.
ROTHSTEIN, Multiple Outcomes or Time-Points within a Study, in INTRODUCTION TO METAANALYSIS 225, 226–27 (2009).
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MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 113 (2001).
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were not sufficient to identify a unique test for a particular hypothesis,
outcome measures of violent offenses were preferred over non-violent
offenses, and measures of offenses against the same victim were preferred
over those against any victim.
While the statistical analysis, sample size, follow-up period, and the use
of offense measures are more generic criteria for methodological rigor, the
preference for tests involving violent offenses and the same or similar victims
stem from our focus on deterrence of re-offending, not rearrest, and on
intimate partner violence rather than violence in general. Arrest records are
relatively easy to obtain, but often reflect police behavior as much as an
offender’s behavior towards their partner. Criminologists have long argued
that arrest, conviction, and incarceration data are more appropriately viewed
as measures of official response to criminal behavior rather than of offense
rates or offenders themselves. 88 Moreover, the use of increased criminal
sanctions for intimate partner violence is primarily designed to reduce future
violence against intimate partners, not all types of offenses against all types
of victims. In addition, a large proportion of intimate partner violence stems
from multiple incidents with the same victim, which increases the preference
for using measures of offense frequency over prevalence or time to failure
measures in this research. 89
In twenty-two studies, only one test was reported; in those instances, we
selected that test as the “best.” Applying our criteria to the existing research
on the specific deterrent effects of criminal sanctions, twelve of the “best”
tests we selected were based on the use of multivariate analyses, the use of
frequency measures, or the use of longer follow-up periods. In eleven tests,
the sample size/follow-up period was the determining factor in selecting the
“best” test. In five studies, we chose tests because they used re-offense as the
criteria for recidivism. Six tests were picked because they defined repeat
offending for violent offenses only, and we selected one test because it
measured repeat offending of the same victim. The potential impact of using
these selection criteria can be seen in Table 2, which reports the frequency of
all 237 reported tests and the “best” tests on the seven selection criteria.
Among all reported tests, only 55% were multivariate analyses; among the
fifty-seven “best” tests, 72% of the tests were multivariate. In addition, forty88
See John I. Kitsuse & Aaron V. Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics, 11
SOC. PROBS. 131, 132–34 (1963); DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY & PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE, LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ARREST STATISTICS 3–5 (1995); Terence P. Thornberry
& Marvin D. Krohn, Comparison of Self-Report and Official Data for Measuring Crime, in
MEASURMENT PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 43, 43–48 (John V. Pepper & Carol
V. Petrie eds., 2003).
89
Garner, Fagan & Maxwell, supra note 52, at 16–18.
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four (77.2%) of the “best” tests count only violent repeat offending compared
to 159 (67.1%) of all tests. Despite these improvements, the “best” tests use
victim interviews only 22.8% of the time; for all tests they were used in
27.8%. Thus, this approach used tests that have some preferred
methodological characteristics, but it can only select the “best” from among
the available studies. Perhaps most importantly, this approach provides a
strong basis for assuming independence between research observations
within each of the three sanction hypotheses. The use of the “best” test
approach was determined prior to the search for studies and the calculation
of standard effect sizes.
To be consistent with prior deterrence research, the original design of
this study specified testing three distinct hypotheses about the deterrent
effects of sanctions and called for the use of a two-sided t test with the
traditional criterion of p < .05 for the determination of statistical significance.
The problems inherent in relying solely on this arbitrary standard recently led
the American Statistical Association (ASA) to recommend that
“[r]esearchers should bring many contextual factors into play to derive
scientific inferences.” 90 Our use of a predetermined p value of 0.05 is
consistent with the approach recommended by John Ioannidis. 91 However,
we provide some qualitative context for our reported findings and report the
results of several sensitivity tests about our quantitative analyses, such as
simple counts of statistical tests and revised meta-analytic findings when
tests with the largest and smallest effect sizes are removed.

90

Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values: Context,
Process, and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129, 131 (2016).
91
John P.A. Ioannidis, The Importance of Predefined Rules and Prespecified Statistical
Analyses: Do Not Abandon Significance, 321 JAMA 2067, 2067–68 (2019).

252

GARNER, MAXWELL & LEE

[Vol. 111

D. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING INDEPENDENCE

A number of prominent researchers have recommended the use of
alternative approaches for addressing the issue of multiple tests in prior
research. The first alternative approach uses the average of all tests within
each study to estimate both the size and the variance of each effect, even
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though the use of the average of multiple variances has limited justification. 92
The second alternative approach also uses the average effect size across all
reported tests but uses statistical procedures to better estimate “robust”
standard errors. “Robust” standard errors are often, but not always, larger
than the actual standard errors. 93 A third alternative approach is to use
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which simultaneously estimates effects
sizes and standard deviations within and between studies. 94 All four of these
approaches employ the traditional inverse-variance weighting method that
gives greater weight to effects from larger studies whose smaller standard
errors produce more precise effect size estimates. 95 These alternative
approaches rely on different underlying assumptions about the nature of the
existing research, the ability to rank order research methods, the amount and
importance of statistical independence of reported tests, and the relative
importance of different objectives of a meta-analysis. Despite the many
similarities in the methods used by these four approaches, we think that the
substantive arguments for using the “best” test approach are compelling and
our conclusions rely heavily on the “best” test approach.
All of the approaches used to estimate deterrence effects use the same
method to convert the results from different types of statistical tests published
in the original reports into a common metric. Consistent with the
recommendations made by several analysists, the logged odds ratio is used
for this purpose. 96 To create logged odds ratios for all 237 tests, the bivariate
proportions, mean differences, correlations, and regression coefficients,
along with their associated measures of variance and relevant sample sizes,
were entered into Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (version #3) (CMA) to
produce a standardized odds ratio with associated standard errors for each of
the 237 tests. The resulting standardized effects sizes and variance estimates
92

Fulgencio Marín-Martínez & Julio Sánchez-Meca, Averaging Dependent Effect Sizes
in Meta-Analysis: A Cautionary Note About Procedures, 2 SPANISH J. PSYCH. 32, 37 (1999).
93
Larry V. Hedges, Elizabeth Tipton & Matthew C. Johnson, Robust Variance Estimation
in Meta-Regression with Dependent Effect Size Estimates, 1 RSCH. SYNTHESIS METHODS 39,
45 (2010).
94
See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR
MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODs (2d ed. 2002) (providing examples
and explanations of the theory and use of hierarchical linear models).
95
Moeyaert, Ugille, Beretvas, Ferron, Bunuan & Van den Noortgate, supra note 86, at
561–62; Larry Hedges & Kimberly Maier, Meta-Analysis, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
MULTILEVEL MODELING 487, 497 (Mark A. Scott, Jeffrey S. Simonoff & Brian D. Marx eds.,
2013).
96
Joseph. L. Fleiss & Jesse A. Berlin, Effect sizes for dichotomous data, in THE
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND META-ANALYSIS, 237 (Harris Cooper, Larry V.
Hedges & Jeffrey C. Valentine, eds., 2d ed. 2009); TERRI D. PIGOTT, ADVANCES IN METAANALYSIS 11–12 (2012); LIPSEY & WILSON, supra note 87, at 53.
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produced by CMA are used in all four of the approaches we use to estimate
specific deterrent effects. When using logged odds ratios, coefficients equal
to zero represent no impact of the criminal sanction. In our comparison of
more severe versus less severe sanctions, negative coefficients indicate a
deterrent effect while positive coefficients indicate an escalation or
criminogenic effect. Since the underlying population effect is likely to vary
because of structural differences across studies, all four approaches use a
mixed-effects model.
III. FINDINGS

A. BEST EFFECTS
Figure 2 presents a forest plot of the results of each study’s “best” test
sorted from the smallest estimated log odds ratio—the one most supportive
of deterrence—to the highest estimated log odds ratio—the one least
supportive of deterrence of the prosecution hypothesis. We also present the
confidence interval for that estimate, the value of the two-sided z test, the p
value for that test, and the relative weight of each study resulting from the
use of inverse-variance weighting method. The relative weight among these
studies varied from about three to almost twenty percent. Seven of the ten
studies of the prosecution hypothesis produce an effect in the direction of a
deterrent effect, and three of these effects exceed the 1.96 standard threshold
for a statistically significant t test. These three studies combined relative
weight is about twenty percent.
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None of the three studies producing a log odds ratio in the direction of
an escalation effect produced a statistically significant effect. However, the
combined weight of the studies reporting escalation effects exceeds forty
percent. A traditional literature review or vote-counting approach to
synthesizing findings would likely find the seven-to-three ratio of results
supportive of an overall deterrent effect; however, the relatively small
number of studies and the substantial weight given to several studies not
supportive of deterrent effects produce a meta-analytic finding in the
direction of deterrence (-0.196) but with a nonsignificant p value of 0.095.
We tested the sensitivity of this finding by removing the prosecution study
most supportive of deterrence; this nine-study analysis produces a mean odds
ratio to -.115, which is also not statistically significant. However, the
prosecution results are sensitive to removing the study least supportive of
deterrence; the analysis of the remaining nine studies produces a mean odds
ratio of -0.246 with a statistically significant p value of .041.
In the same format as Figure 2, Figure 3 lists the twenty-six studies
testing the specific deterrent effects of conviction. While fifteen (58%) of
these studies produce effects predicted by deterrence theory, just two of those
reported findings are statistically significant. Of the eleven studies showing
an effect for the conviction sanction in the direction of escalation, three
produce a statistically significant effect. The relative weights of these twentysix studies range from 1.55 to 5.78, suggesting less dominance by any one
study or group of studies than was present in testing the prosecution
hypothesis. The meta-analytic summary of these twenty-six studies produces
an effect size 0.021, which is not only small but is in the opposite direction
from what one would expect to find if convictions produced a deterrent
effect. Removing the study most supportive or least supportive of deterrence
does not change the direction or statistical significance of the conviction
effect.
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Figure 4 lists the twenty-one studies which report on the specific
deterrent effects of incarceration. Nine of these studies report an effect in the
direction of deterrence, but only two of those are statistically significant. Of
the twelve studies that reported an escalation effect, seven of them are
statistically significant. The relative weights of these twenty-one studies
range from a low of 1.08 to a high of 6.08, with no clear tendency for studies
with a deterrent or escalation effect. With a seven-to-two ratio of statistically
significant effects, a literature review or a vote-counting synthesis of these
studies would likely reach a conclusion that incarceration is associated with
more repeat offending. Our meta-analysis produced a statistically significant
(p value = 0.001) log odds ratio of 0.367 which points towards an escalation
of offending rather than a reduction in offending. Thus, in contrast to less
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severe sanctions like prosecution or conviction, incarceration of intimate
partner violence offenders is associated with a large, statistically significant
increase in their rate of offending.

However, among these twenty-one studies, one effect size is five times
larger than the next largest effect. Removing this one outlier reduces the
average effect size to 0.269, but it is still substantial and statistically
significant with a p value of 0.012. Removing the study that is most
supportive of a deterrent effect for incarceration increases the log odds of
escalation to 0.405 with a p value of less than .000.
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As displayed in Table 3, using the “best” test approach generates distinct
findings for each of the three hypotheses about post-arrest sanctions tested
here. The ten prosecution studies produce a modest-sized effect in the
direction of deterrence, but these findings do not meet the traditional twosided t test for statistical significance. Our confidence in the prosecution
findings, however, is limited by the small number of studies, the large
variation in study impact due to the inverse-variance weighting procedure,
and the sensitivity of these findings when removing the most and least
favorable studies. Conversely, the existence of twenty-six more evenly
weighted studies of the conviction hypothesis and the lack of an effect from
removing outlier studies increases our confidence in the findings that there is
no deterrent or escalation effect for the sanction of conviction. The twentyone tests of the incarceration hypothesis produce a large effect in the
direction of escalation effect exceeds the standards for statistical significance
even when an extreme outlier is removed.
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Some scholars are critical of the potential lack of objectivity in the
selection of “best” tests. They and other scholars recommend the use of
alternative meta-analytic methods for addressing the non-independence of
research observations. This criticism of using the “best” test, if well founded,
would undermine one of the main goals of meta-analysis, which is to remove
the bias inherent in unstructured, qualitative methods of reviewing research
literature. In order to address this concern, Table 3 reports the findings of our
meta-analyses and the findings that are generated using three alternative
meta-analytic methods. The first alternative approach averages effects within
each study (Average). The second alternative approach uses all tests as
independent effects but uses robust standard errors to estimate coefficients
and compute statistical tests (RSE). 97 The third alternative approach uses
hierarchical models incorporating other study level and effect level tests
(HLM). 98 Table 3 reports the summary findings for each of the three sanction
hypotheses for all four meta-analytic approaches. 99
While there are some differences in the size of the log odds ratios and
standard errors between the four approaches, the substantive findings are
strikingly similar. The findings of no effect for convictions and escalation
effects for incarceration remain consistent across all four approaches. The
findings for prosecution effects are all supportive of deterrence but, for all
three of the alternative approaches, the p values exceed the traditional 0.05
standard, where the “best” test finding does not. However, the p values for
two of the three alternative approaches to test the prosecution hypothesis
exceed the 0.05 standard by just 0.004 and 0.006, producing the same
dilemma of using a fixed standard, only this time on the side of finding a
statistically significant effect. Similar to our conviction and incarceration
findings, other criminological meta-analyses have reported consistent
findings when implementing multiple meta-analytical approaches to the
same body of research. 100
Our conclusion to accept the null hypothesis that prosecution does not
affect repeat intimate partner violence is based on the findings produced by
the “best” test approach to meta-analysis. Our preference for using these
97

Hedges, Tipton & Johnson, supra note 93, at 41.
RAUDENBUSH & BRYK, supra note 94, at 208–10.
99
The results from the first two approaches—using the best and the average effect—were
calculated using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Version 3. The results from the “RSE”
approach were calculated using SPSS 25. The HLM results were produced using HLM 7:
Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling.
100
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect
Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 489 (2011) (reporting, in Table 2,
statistically significant odds-ratios between 1.53 and 1.74 for meta-analysis approaches using
the average smallest, largest, and best effect sizes).
98
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criteria over others is because our initial design included establishing explicit
rules for selecting the best test among those reported in our 29 studies. We
established these criteria and the use of the p < .05 standard with two-tailed
test before we extracted data from publications to generate logged odds ratios
and standard errors or compiled our forest plots or the formal statistical
analyses reported in Table 3. As noted earlier, there is controversy in the
research community about the value of retaining the .05 standard and there
are multiple approaches to producing meta-analyses. Each approach has
strengths and weaknesses and all have been used in articles appearing in
refereed journals. Because there are advocates for each of these approaches,
conclusions produced by only one approach could easily be regarded as
suspect to some readers. While some scholars reject findings unless they are
derived from an approach they prefer, we and others believe it is important
to present results from multiple approaches so others can understand the
extent to which findings vary by different meta-analysis approaches. We also
believe that differences in outcome should not influence our preferences for
one methodological approach over another.
In our meta-analyses, all four alternative approaches produced
consistent findings for the conviction and incarceration hypotheses;
therefore, those conclusions are not dependent on the approach we used.
However, the three alternative approaches to testing the prosecution
hypothesis do not produce findings consistent with those produced by the
“best” test approach. While each approach produced a finding in the
deterrence direction, only the “best” test approach did not meet the p < .05
level. Our reporting of findings from the three alternative approaches
clarifies that the failure to find a statistically significant deterrent effect for
prosecution depends on the approach we took. However, that does not mean
that we give the findings from the alternative approaches equal weight in our
conclusion about the effect of prosecution. Similarly, those who prefer
alternative approaches need not give equal weight to our approach in their
judgement about the effect of prosecution. Thus, while willing to report
findings from alternative approaches, this paper relies on the findings from
the statistical tests specified in our original design to determine the existence
of statistically significant effects.
Traditionally, meta-analyses are concerned about the bias that might
result from the existence of completed studies that are not reported and
therefore cannot be included in a systematic review. 101 The principal
concerns have been the failure of authors to submit—or of journals to
101
See Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results, 86
PSYCH. BULL. 638, 640 (1979).
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publish—findings that either (1) find no statistically significant effects, or (2)
are contrary to the accepted findings. We are less concerned with this issue
because many available studies included here report no statistically
significant differences, the ready availability of a large number of
unpublished studies and the diverse findings in this field suggest that no
particular finding is likely to be seen as the only acceptable finding.
However, there is another concern that the available research may reflect a
practice called p-hacking. P-hacking occurs when authors conduct many
analyses but only report findings that exceed the p value < 0.05 standard.
Given the great variety in the number of tests reported in our fifty-seven
studies, the findings reported here might reflect p hacking. Using Uri
Simonsohn, Leif Nelson, and Joseph Simmons’ tests for p-hacking, 102 we
determined that most of our statistically significant results produce a p value
< 0.01 and, therefore, they do not meet Simonsohn, et al.’s standards for phacking. Figure 5 displays this information and reports the statistical tests
rejecting the hypotheses that (1) our studies show no evidentiary power and
(2) our study’s evidentiary power is inadequate.

102
Uri Simonsohn, Leif D. Nelson & Joseph P. Simmons, P-Curve: A Key to the FileDrawer, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 534, 539–44 (2014).
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B. STUDY DESIGN MODERATORS OF DETERRENT EFFECTS

Meta-analytic methods provide a basis to test which, if any, design
characteristics of the available research are associated with stronger or
weaker deterrent or escalation effects. This research uses all fifty-seven
“best” effects to produce an analysis of nine moderators. Two moderators—
whether studies were published in peer reviewed journals and whether the
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studies were published before 2000—provide a test of selection effects of
peer review and whether findings have changed over time. Six of these
moderators were selected prior to data collection because of their presumed
relationship to measuring repeat offending: (1) whether the analysis was
multivariate or bivariate; (2) whether the analysis is based on the prevalence,
frequency or time to first new failure; (3) whether the source of recidivism
data is victim interviews or official records; (4) whether the recidivism is
measured by a new offense, a new arrest, a new prosecution, or a new
conviction; (5) whether recidivism involves only violent offenses or any
offense; and (6) whether offenses against any victim or just the same victim
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are counted. In response to a suggestion from a reviewer, we created a 0 to 6
scale based on the standards for methodological rigor used to select the “best”
tests and grouped each of the fifty-seven studies into three categories—
weaker (less than 2), modest (2 to 4), and stronger (4 or higher)—to assess
the extent to which overall research quality among the available studies
moderates the effects of sanctions.
The findings displayed in Table 4 list the nine potential moderators
along with the number of tests, the log odds ratio, and the z and p values for
each category, as well as the results of the Q test for differences between the
categories for each moderator. 103 For instance, the thirty-three peer reviewed
studies had a log odds ratio of 0.00, but other types of documents had a log
odds ratio of 0.22. Thus, studies producing an escalation effect are less likely
found in peer review journals but, based on the Q statistic, these differences
are not large enough to be statistically significant. Using these same criteria,
there appears to be no trend in the direction of reported findings before and
after 2000 or between bivariate and multivariate analyses. Similarly,
differences in the size of the log odds ratios produced by tests using
frequency measures (0.67) versus those using prevalence (0.03) or survival
(0.06) measures are not large enough to meet the Q test for statistically
significance. Thus, the effects of sanction are not moderated by publication
type, data collection year, analysis type, or recidivism parameter.
Based on statistically significant Q tests, sanction effects are moderated
by five other characteristics: the source of recidivism data, the recidivism
criteria, the recidivism offense, the type of victim, and the overall quality of
the research design. When recidivism is measured using victim interviews,
there is a statistically significant deterrent effect; when measured using
official records, there is a statistically significant escalation effect. When
recidivism is based on new offenses, there is a statistically significant
deterrent effect. When recidivism is based on new arrests or new convictions,
there is a statistically significant escalation effect. Similarly, when recidivism
is limited to violent offenses, the effect is essentially zero; when any type of
offense is used to measure repeat offending, there is a statistically significant
escalation effect. Analyses based on repeat offending against the same victim
produce a nonsignificant deterrent effect; when the analyses include any
victim, there is a statistically significant escalation effect. Lastly, the effect
of sanctions is moderated by the summary measure of research quality with
the stronger research designs producing a statistically significant deterrent
effect and weaker designs generating escalation effects.
103

See Tania B. Huedo-Medina, Julio Sánchez-Meca, Fulgencio Marín-Martinez & Juan
Botella, Assessing Heterogeneity in Meta-Analysis: Q Statistic or I² Index?, 11 PSYCH.
METHODS 193, 199–214 (2006).
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Tammy Kochel and colleagues’ bivariate tests of thirteen moderators of
the relationship between race and arrest found no statistically significant
moderator effects. 104 On the other hand, Travis Pratt and his colleagues’
multivariate analyses found that deterrent theory effect sizes are “sensitive to
a host of methodological variations.” 105 Our bivariate moderator analyses
found significant effects for five out of nine moderators; however, these five
moderators are not independent of each other. The use of victim interviews,
the offense criteria, and same-victim measures are highly correlated, so the
independent impact of each one of these effects is uncertain. 106 These
moderator analyses suggest that the methodological weaknesses of existing
research constrain the ability of that research to accurately detect the extent
to which alternative criminal sanctions reduce intimate partner violence.
Three of our fifty-seven studies are derived from Canadian samples.
Removing the three Canadian studies changed the effect sizes slightly, but in
no instance did their removal from the analyses change the direction or
statistical significance of any of the tests of these three hypotheses. 107
IV. DISCUSSION
While our approach provides a rigorous review of the existing research,
the methods and measures used in the available research are not always wellequipped to inform policy or to test theory. When possible, these weaker
designs should be avoided in future efforts. More specifically, our metaanalysis identified several areas where investments and enhancements are
needed to improve our understanding of deterrence theory. The first research
priority should be to build on the small numbers of existing studies of
prosecution effects with a few studies large and rigorous enough to resolve
whether prosecution is or is not associated reduced amounts of intimate
partner violence. For these studies, analyses of focused policy interventions
104

Kochel, Wilson & Mastrofski, supra note 100, at 489–90.
Travis C. Pratt, Francis T. Cullen, Kristie R. Blevins, Leah E. Daigle & Tamara D.
Madensen, The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK:
THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 384 (Francis T. Cullen, John Paul Wright &
Kristie R. Blevins eds., 2008).
106
See Mark W. Lipsey, Those Confounded Moderators in Meta-Analysis: Good, Bad,
and Ugly, 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 69, 71–78 (2003) (illustrating the hazards
and complexities of interpreting moderator analyses in meta-analyses).
107
These sources were: Peter Jaffe, David A. Wolfe, Anne Telford & Gary Austin, The
Impact of Police Charges in Incidents of Wife Abuse, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 37 (1986); Lauren
Marsland, Darryl Plecas & Tim Segger, Reticence and Re-Assault Among Victims of
Domestic Violence in a Pro-Charge Jurisdiction (Jan. 2001) (unpublished report) (on file with
J. Crim. L. & Criminology); NATHALIE QUANN, CANADA DEP’T OF JUST., OFFENDER PROFILE
AND RECIDIVISM AMONG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS IN ONTARIO (2006).
105
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may be sufficient to address this basic question, especially if they can address
the problem of selecting high-risk offenders for more severe sanctions and
measure repeat offending using victim interviews as well as official records.
Even if successful, those prosecution studies cannot explain why
potential offenders do or do not repeat their offenses. For that more important
set of questions, future research on sanctions for intimate partner violence
needs to study the decision-making of potential offenders and incorporate not
just the characteristics of sanctions but the variety of factors—including
emotions and fears—that can test alternative theories of the causes of
intimate partner violence. 108 To be especially useful for understanding
intimate partner violence, such panel studies should interview both partners
and capture information relevant to other theories of intimate partner
violence, such as victim empowerment. 109
None of the research included in this meta-analysis adequately
addressed the extent to which more severe criminal justice sanctions were
imposed on individuals because they were thought to have a higher likelihood
of offending again. Some studies of imprisonment have used the random
assignment of cases to judges or propensity scores to at least partially address
the long-standing issue of selection bias in criminology; 110 however, another
promising approach is the development of accurate prediction models for
future incidents of intimate partner violence and the comparison of predicted
failures and actual failures for individuals arrested, prosecuted, convicted, or
incarcerated. 111
In the broader field of deterrence research, theorists have yet to identify
what is the appropriate minimum or maximum time at risk needed to assess
properly the impact of criminal sanctions on subsequent offending. Our
understanding of deterrence is insufficient to specify how quickly and for
how long any particular sanction will or will not affect particular types of
108

See Greg Pogarsky, Sean Patrick Roche & Justin T. Pickett, Offender DecisionMaking in Criminology: Contributions from Behavioral Economics, 1 ANN. REV.
CRIMINOLOGY 379, 389–91 (2018).
109
See Cattaneo & Goodman, supra note 5, at 84; (arguing for the important place of
victim emplowerment as active causal agents in reducing intimate partner violence); Mills,
supra note 62, at 313–16 (emphasizing the role of victims in the understanding the casual
relationship between criminal justice policies and repeat offending).
110
See, e.g., Daniel P. Mears, Joshua C. Cochran, William D. Bales & Avinash S. Bhati,
Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 81, 141–44 (2016)
(reviewing the use of alternative methodological approaches to test the effects of
imprisonment on future criminal behavior).
111
See generally Kirk R. Williams & Richard Stansfield, Disentangling the Risk
Assessment and Intimate Partner Violence Relation: Estimating Mediating and Moderating
Effects, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 344 (2017) (demonstrating how the use of domestic violence
risk assessments was associated with reduced recidivisim for high risk perpetrators).
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criminal behavior. Should the specific deterrent effects of criminal sanctions
last about as long as an aspirin cures a headache, as long as a flu vaccine
prevents the flu, or as long as the polio vaccine prevents polio? Sanction
theories needed to address that fundamental question before research can
properly determine the appropriate time at risk for measuring repeat
offending. Future research on sanctions for intimate partner violence may
also benefit from what we learned from our moderator analysis. Although
best viewed as more descriptive and exploratory than rigorous hypothesis
testing, our moderator analysis suggests that future research on the deterrent
effects of intimate partner violence would be stronger if it emphasized
offense-based frequency measures of violent offending perpetrated against
the same victim and if those measures of repeat offending were obtained from
victim interviews.
This research was motivated by the inattention to intimate partner
violence and to sanctions other than arrest or imprisonment in existing
reviews of deterrence research. The findings presented here demonstrate that
those reviews have ignored a large body of research that reveals real
differences in the size and direction of the deterrent effects that different
criminal sanctions have on intimate partner violence. Future research on
deterrence might benefit from incorporating Durlauf and Nagin’s suggestion
that deterrent effects might vary by different types of sanctions and for a
variety of offense types. 112
At the present time, several federal programs promote the use of more
prosecution, conviction, and incarceration for intimate partner violence. The
evidence from this research is that there is more—not less—violence against
intimate partners when prosecution and conviction are followed by
incarceration. These findings provide systematic evidence against the use of
incarceration for this offense; however, we appreciate the concerns that no
one study, even a review of many studies like our meta-analyses, will likely
produce sufficient knowledge to formulate new policies by itself. 113
Nevertheless, the potential harm associated with incarceration cannot be
ignored, and those who advocate for more frequent and more severe postarrest sanctions must either develop alternatives to incarceration or identify
other rationales that provide sufficiently large social benefits to outweigh the
increased frequency of violence associated with the use of incarceration for
intimate partner violence.
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Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 37, at 85–86.
Robert J. Sampson, Christopher Winship & Carly Knight, Translating Causal Claims:
Principles and Strategies for Policy-Relevant Criminology, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
587, 594–96 (2013).
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V. APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Keyword and Search Terms for Meta-Analysis
Intimate Partner Violence
Domestic abuse
Domestic assault
Domestic violence
Family violence
Intimate partner violence
Intimate partner abuse
Intimate terrorism
Spousal abuse
Spousal violence
Wife assault
Wife abuse
Wife batter
Violence against intimate partner
Violence against spousal
Violence against women

Court Disposition
Charge
Conviction
Court
Counseling
Criminal justice system
Disposition
Jail
Incarceration
Legal Intervention
Legal system
Prison
Probation
Prosecution
Sanction
Sentencing

Recidivism
Deterrence
Reabuse
Rearrest
Reassault
Recharge
Recidivism
Reconviction
Reoffense
Repeat abuse
Repeat offense
Revictimization
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Appendix 2: Documents Used in the Meta-Analyses
Margret E. Bell, et al., Criminal case outcomes, incarceration, and
subsequent intimate partner violence, 28 JOURNAL OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE (2013).
Eve Buzawa, et al., Response to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active Court
Setting (University of Massachusetts-Lowell 1999).
Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Through the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence: The relationship between empowerment in
the court system and well-being for intimate partner violence victims,
25 JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (2010).
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